The Quarterly Journal of Political Studies of Islamic World

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Persian articles:
1. Nuclear Cooperation - military and Strategic Alliance between USA & Israel.
   Ali akbar Jafari. Assistant Prof. Mazandaran university. Iran.
2. Cause of Formation and Nature of Political Movements in Middle East. Case of Study Political Movement in Yemen.
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3. From Movement to Institution, the Shia Resurgence in the Middle East
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4. Conceptualization of Revolution and Problems of Theoretical Analysis
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5. The Role of Nuclear Energy in Iran's National Power.
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   Announcement of the third electronic international conference on new "New evolutions of Iran and world".

English articles:
6. The US and Israel Securitization of Iran's Nuclear Energy
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7. On Why the United States Should Not Attack Iran; A Conservative, Evangelical Christian Response
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   - The Journal is published in Persian and English.
   - The abstracts in the Persian edition are translated into English.
   - The abstracts in the English edition are translated into Persian.

2. Generalities:
   - The articles should report the results of scholarly research of the author(s).
   - The articles should be original and innovative.
   - The articles should observe academic research methodology and must demonstrate an awareness of other recent work carried out on the area on which they report.
   - The articles should be analytical. Therefore, translated and compiled works are by no means acceptable.

3. Evaluation of the Articles:
   Submitted articles are initially reviewed by the board of editors. Once the paper is accepted, it is then sent to selected reviewers. To avoid any bias, articles received are blind reviewed. The boards of editors announce their final decision; an acceptance is dependent upon their recommendation for publication.

4. Submission Guidelines:
   1. The papers should be highly structured by observing the rules of syntax and semantics.
   2. The paper should contain the followings in order:
      2-1. the title should be concise and informative.
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2-3. Persian abstract (15 lines at most), same rule applies to English abstracts.

2-4. Keywords (6 words maximum), Persian and English abstracts.

2-5. Introduction, including general background and reference to prepare the reader for the main argument

2-6. the main text in which the writer claims and analyses his argument.

2-7. Conclusion

2-8. References

2-9. Writer(s)’s name along with academic position in English

3. To make references in the text to other publications do so in the following way: author’s name, date and page number in parenthesis, e.g. (Jahez Basri, 1986: 275)

4. Bibliography:

Give full biographical details of references and list them in alphabetical order of author: last name, first name, date of publication (inside parenthesis), name of the book “in inverted commas”, the editor’s name, place of publication publisher’s name, and volume.

5. Citing a magazine: last name, first name, date of publication (inside parenthesis), name of or translator, name of the collection, place of publication, publisher’s name, page numbers (from p.8 to p.10)

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8. Proper names, Latin expressions and compound words should be immediately followed after its Persian version in parenthesis.

9. The Editor reserves the right to accept, refuse or to make editorial changes in any manuscript accepted for publication to enhance style and clarity.

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The US and Israel Securitization of Iran’s Nuclear Energy¹

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Abstract

The speech act made by the U.S. and Israel has been a tremendous effective instrument in convincing the world that the ambition of Iran of acquiring nuclear energy is capable to become an existential threat to the whole world. It is in this regard that the proponent had scrutinized how the U.S. and Israel securitized Iran’s nuclear issue. The Copenhagen School (CS) on securitization was utilized as the paradigm, which the paper had critically analysed the process made by the U.S. and Israel. The following key points are the characters attributed from the CS thesis:

1. Iran’s nuclear ambition as a security issue determined to be a social construction presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object.
2. The governments of the U.S. and Israel were considered the securitizing actors.
3. The Americans and Israelis were the referent objects that possessed legitimate claim to survival and that their existences are ostensibly threatened.
4. This will be successful if the specific audiences i.e. the American and Israel political elites, businessmen and their public opinion are convinced. And
5. the most important is the language of security which is the ‘speech act’, this can be realized with the help of declarations, policies, speeches of leaders, and sensationalizing the issue through the medium of international media because it informs and influences the perception of reality and has direct impact on human behaviour and outcome. Therefore, the proponent concludes that base on historical facts; it shows that the U.S. and her allies were the culprit and perpetrators in giving Iran the capacity to develop nuclear energy, though a part of the blame should also go to the Shah’s administration or the Pahlavi dynasty’s thirst for power and greediness which were in contrast with Islamic principles and beliefs.

Key words:

Copenhagen and Singaporean Securitization theories, Iran’s Nuclear Energy, Israel’s Speech Act, the United States’ Speech Act, United Nations.

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Caveat:

The title above is quite absurd due to the fact that in the traditional sense of defining security any country aspiring for weapons of mass destruction or WMDs, obviously nuclear used for developing weapons, is part and parcel of that nexus and is apparently a security issue; in other words it doesn’t need the securitization process. It absolutely manifests the core concepts of traditional security which is akin to military, war, or what we should say high politics of hard power prior to the pot-Cold War period. However, my conception of the above statement is merely a Western thought, though majority in the academia that specializes in international security accept that premise. One would ask if we can actually securitize a security issue. The answer is definitely no, because in the first place, it has been securitized and an extraordinary response was made to normalize the matter.

The nuclear energy issue of Iran is a different case because it was foreseen as an unprecedented security matter by Israel and the United States in which Iran hasn’t developed a culpable force of nuclear enrichment particularly high uranium ingredient that would be used for military defence or political weapons as how the West reiterated this contention. The thin difference in securitizing Iran’s nuclear energy ambition is looking at a causational link that made Iran decided to produce its own nuclear energy enrichment, which scholars have been debating on the intent and purpose of Iran. The presented assumptions were political and an economic one. Political in a sense that the proponent contends that the West and its allies perceived Iran’s nuclear development as factor that will escalate regional instability and further will posed an unprecedented existential threat to them, while economical because, in an Iranian perspective, it will only be utilize for energy and electricity consumption to provide an increasing demand for their population or should I say business matters, e.g., trade.

Now, these colluding perspectives and conflicting interests will only aggravate tensions and animosity among the concerned parties which may result to hostilities and probable unwanted
war(s) may break out. The delimitations that I posit is neither will focus on debates or arguments whether this matter is a traditional or non-traditional security, or in other words, a military issue or energy security, nor dealings such as hypothetical inquiries regarding the “ifs or what ifs” of the intent, motivation and purpose of Iran, i.e., weapon or energy usage. Thus it will concentrate on Iran’s nuclear energy under the context of the redefined security which was presented in the Copenhagen school of thought or the so-called ‘securitization framework,’ deviating from the traditional to non-traditional security, the approach on securitizing Iran’s ambition of nuclear energy enrichment will be in accordance of trying to understand the Iranian perspective because most of the scholarly articles have unfairly subjugated Iran as a threat which are deemed subjective and bias.

Furthermore, scarcity or lack of Iranian’s published works written in English have affected the framing of every region in the world particularly the allies and some non-allies of the United States. Considering their perceptions and understandings were also influenced by published Western academic works and especially when it comes from the sensationalized news from the international correspondents or programs of CNN, BBC, Fox et al. Media is really a powerful weapon in influencing the behavior of states and/or individuals. To deeply understand the identity of Iran’s aspiration for nuclear energy, the proponent will diagnostically presents two asserted propositions: (1) the historical background of how Iran acquired nuclear capability vis-à-vis with its motivations, and (2) the Copenhagen securitization framework of Iran’s nuclear energy to explain how Israel and the United States perceived it as an existential threat.

The Origin of Iran’s Nuclear Energy and its Motivations

Iran’s adversaries often told that she doesn’t need to build nuclear energy because of her large reserves of gas and oil, but in the course of its existence from pre-Islamic revolution to recent, empirical studies showed that Iran needs an inconceivable amount of energy resources to supply its increasing population and demand for electricity where she cannot rely exclusively alone on an aging oil and gas industry. To give you an example, according to Afrasiabi (p. 19, 2006) Iran has not been able to reach the
production level of 5.5 million barrels per day because of American sanctions since the Islamic Republic was established. There are actually 57 out of 60 major oil fields that need major repairs and upgrading, which would require $40 billion over 15 years.

In other words, the current production level of Iran is 3.5 million barrels a day, whereby if this trend continues it will be catastrophic to Iran’s economy because it relies on oil for 80 percent of its foreign currency and 45 percent of its annual budget. Consequently, Iran has the fundamental right for securing adequate energy resources just like any other countries who aspire for development and technological advancement. In addition, from the political point of view, Iran wanted to establish its place in the international community and assert its hegemonic position in the West Asian region or more so to the Islamic world. This view might irritate the Arab world particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia though some country members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) support this postulated prism.

The reason being here is to probably enforce a well-balanced leadership in the Islamic world, e.i., establishing the three Islamic holy places into an OIC control sites and publishing academic works of universal or cosmopolitan interpretation of pristine Islam worldwide, which is not based from any cultural preferences or any schools of thought (so that the Western connotation of extremism will fade away from their schemata). And in to some extent, aspiring for a material and real ummah community by reestablishing the Caliphate system though this thinking might sound idiotic or absurd due to the ethnical and political divide in the Muslim world – Sunni v. Shia, Arab nationalism sans Khadafi’s Libya v. Persian pride and Asian’s distinct views on Islam, and among others.

Another motivation is that Iran is also seeking for diversifying its sources of energy which is similar to the U.S. and Russia resorting to renewable nuclear energy. Broad’s article (2008) revealed that since 1985 Iran has copied a Pakistani design known as the P-1, which uses centrifuges that can be used for several applications not only for uranium enrichment but for other energy sources. In
general these centrifuges can spin fast to separate all kinds of objects impurities that are incompatible i.e., mass and density. Iran’s research interest to nuclear development began in the Shah’s administration back in 1960s when a C.I.A. sponsored coup d'état overthrow the government of the nationalist Dr. Mossadeq’s regime and established a monarchical system under the Pahlavi dynasty of Shah Reza Muhammad Pahlavi. Several bilateral agreements were fostered by Iran and the United States.

Detailed information of Iran’s nuclear history can be found in the Payvand’s news article of Sahimi (2003), according to his research the Tehran Nuclear Research Center of the Tehran University was the first significant nuclear facility founded in 1967, which was administered by a special agency dedicated to nuclear research - the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The facility contained a 5-megawatt reactor that can produce a ceiling point of 600 grams of plutonium annually which was actually supplied by the government of the United States of America. On 1 July 1968, Iran signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that was ratified by the Majles, their parliament or congress, and it went into effect on 5 March 1970. In the Article IV of the treaty stipulated that Iran has the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and acquire equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information.

Iran has also special relationship with Israel during those times, because she is the only non-Arab country and has strong political, diplomatic and economic relations with the United States. To give you an example, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Iran have supplied the necessary oil assistance to Israel. Giving the Shah’s administration a subsequent huge increase in the price of oil, thus industrial development and nuclear research programs extensively improved. Sahimi also argued that there was an influential study made by the Stanford Research Institute stating that Iran must increase its nuclear enrichment into an electrical capacity of about 20,000-megawatt to sustain its energy demand from 1970 to 1990. The United States further encouraged Iran to expand non-oil energy base by providing several nuclear reactors.
At present, according to Frenkel (2008), Iran has thousands of centrifuges produce enriched uranium at Natanz, 250 tons of gases are stored in the tunnels of Esfahan, and a heavy water reactor that produces plutonium is situated at Arak. There is also four small nuclear research reactors supplied by China. Thus the study shows that the U.S. and Iran have a symbiotic relationship with each other, while the Iranian government was buying weapons from the U.S., Iran was providing cheap oil to the U.S. to recover herself from the high cost of oil perpetrated by the Arab-Israeli war or the so-called ‘first oil shock.’

In 1975, another agreement was signed between the two governments. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) will provide educational and nuclear research trainings to Iranian engineers of the AEIO, whereby these trained engineers will work at Bushehr reactors and also Iran will buy eight nuclear reactors from the U.S. for generating electricity (Sahimi 2003). An extensive bilateral partnership was fostered on 10 July 1978 through the agreed U.S.-Iran Nuclear Energy Treaty which would supposed to facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material to Iran’s nuclear energy program. Iran was also to receive American technology and help in searching for uranium deposits.

Iran has had established various nuclear agreements with other allies of the United States, namely:

- West Germany’s Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary organ of Siemens) contract on 1974, providing two nuclear reactors at Bushehr with each has a capacity of 1,200-megawatt.
- The Iranian-Indian nuclear cooperation treaty was also signed on that same year, which paradoxically speaking India is now a nuclear based power recognized by the United States.
- Another nuclear research center was established with the help of France providing the technical know-how and trainings for Iranian engineers that would be working at the Nuclear Technology Center of Esfahan. The French company Framatome proposed to build two nuclear reactors and a power plant at Darkhovin and in the city of Ahvaz with an electrical capacity of 950-megawatt.
Even South Africa provided uranium materials to Iran in 1970s. However, a turning point in their diplomatic relationship on 1979 occurred that triggered a change in their foreign policies. An Islamic Revolution happened inspired by a man in the name of Khomeini that the Iranians bestowed him with titles of the ‘Ayatollah’ and of the ‘Ruhollah’ which means friend and sign of God, a highly venerated and admired person cognizant of becoming a saint which is in contrast with the Sunni traditional beliefs. And of course the infamous American hostages by Iranian militants that last more than a year. In which they (the militants) politically contend that the U.S. have also held Iran hostage like puppets of their whimsical beliefs dictating the internal affairs of the country that led to a forlorn and lost sovereignty existed for decades.

Leaving the nuclear program and research works incomplete and was paralyzed for a long time. According to Sahimi, the Bushehr-1 (reactor 1) was 90% complete and 60% of its equipment had been installed, while Bushehr-2 was 50% complete. The event also resulted to cancellations of nuclear projects initiated by the U.S. pressures to the governments of Germany, France, India and South Africa. Moreover, the two reactors at Bushehr were bombed six times (in March 1984, February 1985, March 1985, July 1986, and twice in November 1987) during the Iran-Iraq war, which the U.S. assisted Iraq by providing them anti-ballistic missiles and other conventional weapons.

According to Sahimi, the representatives from the Germany's National Reactor Inspectorate argued that before the bombings, Bushehr-1 could have been completed in about three years. However, at the time of the bombings, none of the main equipments had been installed, and in fact two steam generators (that use the heat from the reactors to produce steam to be used in power generators) were stored in Italy, while the pressure vessel for Bushehr-1 was stored in Germany. Due to a grave and chronic shortage of electricity and a looming population explosion, President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s government restarted the nuclear program. First, Iran went to Germany and approached the Kraftwerk Union to complete the Bushehr project. But the company refused due to the U.S. pressure.
Iran then asked Germany to allow Kraftwerk to ship the reactor components and technical documentation that it had paid for, citing a 1982 International Commerce Commission (ICC) ruling under which Siemens was obligated to deliver all plant materials and components stored outside Iran, but the German government still refused to do so (Sahimi 2003). Due to consistent rejections from the German government, Iran filed a lawsuit in August 1996 with the ICC, asking for $5.4 billion in compensation for Germany’s failure to comply with the 1982 ruling. However, the issue is still unsettled. (Sahimi 2003)

In the late 1980s, a consortium of companies from Argentina, Germany and Spain submitted a proposal to Iran to complete the Bushehr-1 reactor, but huge pressure by the US stopped the deal. The US pressure also stopped in 1990 Spain’s National Institute of Industry and Nuclear Equipment to complete the Bushehr project. Iran also tried, unsuccessfully, to procure components for the Bushehr reactors, but her attempts were blunted by the US. (Sahimi 2003) For example, in 1993, Iran tried to acquire eight steam condensers, built by the Italian firm Ansaldo under the Kraftwerk Union contract, but they were seized by the Italian government. The Czech firm Skoda Plzen also discussed supplying reactor components to Iran, but, under the US pressure, negotiations were cancelled in 1994. Iran was also not successful in her attempt to buy nuclear power reactor components from an unfinished reactor of Poland. (Sahimi 2003)

So after an unrelentless search for nuclear energy to the Western world, Iran shifted to the East by acquiring communiqués and signing treaties from Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) and China. Some of these agreements were the following based from the Sahimi’s article:

- In March 1990, her first protocol on the Bushehr project with the Soviet Union was signed.
- In 1991, China provided Iran with uranium hexafluoride (a uranium compound, which is gaseous state, and used for enriching uranium) which is under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA, a subsidiary organ of the United Nations) safeguard.
In 1992, Iran signed an agreement with China for building the reactors in Darkhovin, but the terms of the agreement have not yet been carried out by China. Given the proximity of the site to the border with Iraq, it is probably not prudent to proceed with that project at that particular site.

In 1993, the AEOI and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed an agreement for the construction of two Russian reactors at Bushehr, but the contract was never carried out as Iran was facing major financial problems.

January 1995, Iran signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to finish the reactors at Bushehr. These reactors will be under the IAEA safeguards, and will be capable of producing up to 180 kg/year of plutonium in their spent fuel. The agreement called for Russia to complete the first reactor at Bushehr within four years, although it is still unfinished; to provide a 30-50 megawatt thermal light-water research reactor, 2,000 tons of natural uranium, and training for about 15 Iranian nuclear scientists per year.

Iran and Russia also agreed to discuss the construction of a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility in Iran. However, in May 1995, the U.S. announced that it had convinced Russia to cancel the centrifuge agreement, although Russia later denied that the agreement with Iran ever existed. The light-water research reactor deal has also been cancelled.

Sahimi added that most experts believed that the completion of the Bushehr project by Russia is a highly complex task. The Kraftwerk Union has not provided any technical documents to either Iran or Russia. Since Russia plans to install a reactor, her engineers must modify what Kraftwerk Union had left behind to accommodate the Russian reactor and its support system, which differ in many significant ways from the German reactor. For example, the structure of the steam generators in the Russian reactors is significantly different from the original German reactors. The reactor is supposed to start operating in early 2004. Currently, Iran has nuclear research centers operating in different sites: one is the Bonaab Atomic Energy Research Center (which is south of city of Tabriz), which is a research center for applications of nuclear technology in agriculture. Secondly, is the Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine at Karaj (near Tehran) which is run by the AEOI. (Sahimi 2003) None of these are considered to be for military applications.
Iran’s Nuclear Energy: An existential threat to the U.S. and Israel’s security?

In its broadest and academic term, “security” has been defined contemporarily by Buzan and Waever (1998) as being that special type of politics in which specified developments are socially constructed threats, having an existential quality to cover values and/or assets of human collectivities and leading to a call for emergency measures. In conceptualizing the securitization theory they have developed a paradigm that would dominate the entire security studies in the academia, this is the Copenhagen Securitization (CS) framework. It contends that securitization, is not just a call for political priority, but if need be, for permission to break the normal rules of politics i.e. by using force, by taking executive powers, or by imposing secrecy.

Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (2006, p. 23) added that it is when the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics and may refers to the classification of and consensus about certain phenomena, persons or entities as existential threats requiring emergency measures. They explained that securitization is thus mostly about calls for closure against things perceived as existentially threatening and further, the consensual establishment of threat needs to be sufficient so as to produce substantial political effects. What constitutes an existential threat is thus viewed by CS stating that it depends on a shared understanding of what is meant by such a danger to security. Threat may be classified into three according to Solidum et al (p. 28): actual, potential, and fictitious.

1) Actual threats are existing conditions that can, at any moment, reduce security;
2) potential threats are conditions tending to reduce security but are not transformable to actual threats due to some constraints; and
3) fictitious threats are conditions that are perceived to reduce security but do not really exist.
Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (p. 21-23) asserted that the CS, a body of research mainly associated with the work of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, has developed a relevant instrument to conceptualize the theory of securitization. This theory outlines the political nature of “doing” security and challenges the traditional approach to security - concerned with identifying and dealing with supposedly self-evident threats - and introduces a social-constructivist perspective that considers how problems are transformed into security issues. Securitization is the successful process of labelling an issue a security issue and results in the transformation of the way of dealing with it. This transformation has relevant implications; through the label “security” problems are turned into existential threats that require exceptional, emergency measures, which may include breaking otherwise binding rules or governing by decrees rather than by democratic decisions. Haacke (2007, p. 3) simply puts that to securitize an issue is to present as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.

In Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (p. 23-24), they were five key terminologies in the process of securitization which was presented by CS for security studies, namely: security, securitizing actors, referent objects, specific audience, and the speech act.

- **Security.** A socially constructed concept about survival whereby an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object. It is securitized when articulated by a securitizing actor.
- **Securitizing Actors.** These are governments, international organizations or civil society actors that securitize an issue by articulating the existence of threat(s) to the survival of specific referent object.
- **Referent Objects.** These can be individuals and groups (refugees, victims of human rights abuses, etc.) as well as security issues like states (military security), national sovereignty or an ideology (political security), national economies (economic security), collective identities (societal security), or species or habitats (environmental security) that possess a “legitimate” claim to survival and whose existence is ostensibly threatened.
Specific Audience. The act of securitization is only successful and complete once the securitizing actor succeeds in using the language of security which is the “speech act” to convince a specific or significant audience e.g. public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites, etc. that a referent object(s) is/are existentially threatened.

Speech Act. This is an important part in the process of securitization. According to Waever (1998), with the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. Through this process, two things became very clear. First, the word "security" is the act and second, the utterance is the primary reality. Caballero-Anthony and Emmers (p. 24) further explained that speech informs and influences our perception of reality and has a direct impact on human behaviour and outcome.

We will now designate the classifications of the Copenhagen Securitization framework to explain how the United States and Israel perceived Iran’s nuclear energy as a threat to their security.

Security Threat (unprecedented and existential)

Iran’s ambition for nuclear energy has been perceived by many Western secondary sources like books, journals, periodicals, etc. as an existential threat to their survival. One example is a special program hosted by Chris Wallace of the Fox news, titled “Iran: The Nuclear Threat,” that aired on 8 May 2005. (Afrasiabi 2006, p. 101). It is simply an explicit manifestation on how bias and subjective was the report is. Another was the utterance declared by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon calling that behind an Iranian nuclear energy was a bomb, thus making it the biggest “existential threat” to the Jewish state. Consequently, if we will going to base it what kind of threat they have established, the proponent would say that it’s a small margin between potential to fictitious threat because all that they have conceived were always on what they think it is subject to their preconditions and norms concomitant with what
secondary sources would tell them sans understanding and analyzing the Iranian perspective.

**Securitizing Actors or Agents**

It is pretty obvious that the primal agents who initiated the threats were states like the United States of America and Israel. And to some extent, non-state actors are also being considered which are the United States Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union (EU). Before, there was a so-called EU3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) which was negotiating with Iran to come up with a viable offer that would make Iran halt their ambition of attaining nuclear energy, however, now, the diplomacy did not prosper which of course resulted to EU sanctions on Iran’s economy.

**Referent Objects**

These are the national sovereignty and political security of the United States, Israel and its allies that are at stake for their legitimate claims on survival. However, if we’re going to analyze the situation it’s the other way around ... that Iran’s sovereignty and inalienable right to nuclear energy which are threatened, Like for example, there were circumventing reports that Israel will attack Iran’s nuclear sites even without the U.S. consent because according to their intelligence data, Iran will have nuclear weapons on 2010 (Frenkel 2008).

Another distinct example was that the United States was not looking for an excuse to go to war with Iran according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates (AFP 2007). This was in line with their intelligence reports that Iran’s Quds Force, an elite branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, was training Iraqi extremists and supplying them with armor piercing bombs and other conventional weapons. Further asserting that there was no doubt that the elite Al-Quds Force was behind with the powerful, new improvised explosive devices (IEDS) killing U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

**Specific Audiences**

As we have reiterated that the ‘speech act’ will not be successful if specific groups were not convinced. Public opinion is one of the instruments that measure the success of the speech act. The
groups that the proponent was specifying at were the politicians or political elites, military officials, and some civilian sectors of the United States, Israel and to some extent UNSC members and the EU3.

Several Western media reports and academic sources have pointed out that their existence were being threatened by the ambition of Iran acquiring for nuclear energy because they contend that the it may possibly be converted to arsenals thus wiping them off the map. Thus most reports would tend and equate it to the comment made by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when he visited Columbia University, though this report was proportionately taken out of context and made sensationalized all over America and its allies.

Speech Acts

This is the most important part of the securitization theory because it legitimized the claim of an existential threat through declarations and policies implemented by the securitizing actors. There were several executive orders implemented by the United States and Israel in containing and sanctioning Iran’s economy due to their claim of Iran’s nuclear energy will be used for WMD. These sanctions have had freeze Iranian financial assets in several Western banks and sanction whatever companies who will provide nuclear technology, technical know-how, and other assistance in helping Iran build nuclear energy.

Other sanctions in the form of resolutions were also made particularly by the United Nations Security Council:

- UNSC Resolution 8792 (2006), Security Council demands Iran suspend Uranium enrichment by 31 August 2006 or face possible economic and diplomatic sanctions.
- UNSC Resolution 8928 (2006), the Council imposes sanctions on Iran for failure to halt Uranium enrichment, unanimously adopting Resolution 1737 (Measures will be lifted if Iran suspends Activities; report due from Atomic Energy Agency on compliance within 60 Days).
UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006), Sanctions imposed on Iran for nuclear enrichment.
UNSC Resolution 1803 (2007), they also welcomed agreement between Iran, Atomic Energy Agency to resolve outstanding issues on Iran’s nuclear program.
UNSC Resolution 1747(2007), Further sanctions imposed on Iran for nuclear enrichment.
UNSC Resolution 8980 (2007), Security Council toughens sanctions against Iran, adds arms embargo, with unanimous adoption of Resolution 1747 (Further steps promised if no compliance reported by IAEA in 60 days; Iran’s Foreign Minister says pressure, intimidation will not change policy).
UNSC Resolution 9268 (2008), they tightens restrictions on Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, increases vigilance over Iranian banks, and states inspect cargo.

Concluding Remarks

Therefore, the proponent can conclude that base on the historical facts; it shows that the U.S. and her allies were the culprit and perpetrators in giving Iran the capacity to develop nuclear energy, though a part of the blame should also go to the Shah’s administration or the Pahlavi dynasty’s thirst for power and greediness which were in contrast with Islamic principles and beliefs. The proponent will also have to saliently acknowledge that when Iran restarted its nuclear program on mid-1980s, the United States and her allies have been given every opportunity to participate in the development and construction of nuclear reactors in Iran, which would have provided them with significant control on the reactors and their products, but they have always refused to do so.

It is really interesting how the U.S. et al securitize Iran’s nuclear energy as an existential threat to their security. A report was published in Philippine Daily Enquirer (2007) that the U.N. Atomic watchdog chief Mohamed ElBaradei said that he had no evidence that Iran was building nuclear weapons and accused the U.S.’ and its allies’ leaders of adding “fuel to the fire,” after they have inspected Iran’s nuclear sites. It is the reason that AEIA will only provide technical point of view based on facts and does not want
to be associated with some political bickering to expand their interest in the ambit of politicization. There was also a fundamental ideological objection to weapons of mass destruction, including a religious decree issued by the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran prohibiting the development, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons. Since then nuclear enrichment have only been for research and technological development i.e., electricity consumption and other energy products.

If you will analyze the History of Iran, it gives a perfect illustration of its geo-strategic outlook. Over the past 250 years, Iran has not waged a single act of aggression against its neighbors, nor has it initiated any hostilities. In to-to, the study needs more empirical base orientation in trying to give a profound Iranian perspective against the elaborative study done by the Orientals or American neoconservatives. This is not actually presenting a one-dimensional side or defending Iran aspiration for nuclear energy but to give another perspective and paradigm from the dominant literature that stipulates Iran is a threat to the ideals and survival of the Western traditional beliefs and security of the world.

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The US and Israel Securitization of Iran’s Nuclear Energy /20
On Why the United States Should Not Attack Iran: A Conservative, Evangelical Christian Response

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Abstract

In the midst of American intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the aftermath of the presidential election in Iran, support for American involvement in Iran has increased in some circles. In this piece, our desire is to give a conservative, evangelical Christian response to why America should not support any military action against Iran. A position advocated by many of us is “Just War.” In short, this position permits war if certain conditions are met. Just War theory has a long and storied heritage in the Western world, going back to writers such as Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius. Two criteria in particular are relevant. The first is just cause: there must be a specific reason for going to war. The second criterion is last resort: all other nonviolent options must be pursued. In the case of Iran, we see no just cause for a military strike. The nuclear issue does not provide just cause for military intervention, nor does the aftermath of the most recent presidential election. Iran has not attacked either the United States or any other vulnerable country. As conservative evangelicals, we find ourselves on the dovish end of the Just War spectrum. As followers of Christ, our impulse is to be at peace with all men, personally. The apostle Paul instructs us, “If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone” (Romans 12.8). Our reflex is nonviolence. The gospel of Christ is not advanced by means of the sword. However, it is also true that the Christian

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Scriptures teach that the state may legitimately employ force in order to protect her citizens and keep public order. Indeed, the state is given these responsibilities by God himself. Christians, consequently, are called upon to support the government in its legitimate role. It is incumbent upon Christians, therefore, to urge their leaders in Congress and their President to shape foreign policy in a manner that reflects the peaceful and non-violent dispositions described in Scripture. Unless the global community is threatened by the actions of Iran (which currently they are not), the American government must not interfere and allow Iranians to determine their own fate. Military intervention must have just cause and it must necessarily be a last resort.

United States Foreign Intervention Since the Imperial Era

Stephen Kinzer is a three-time New York Times Bureau Chief (Berlin, Istanbul, and Managua). In 2006, Times Books published Overthrow, which is Kinzer’s summary of the United States’ foreign involvement from the late 19th century until the present. Because it provides the context from within which to understand his later book, All the Shah’s Men, and our later discussion, it is helpful to take a look at the broad contours of his argument.

In Overthrow, Kinzer focuses on US involvement in fourteen countries. He divides the work into three parts: The Imperial Era (1893-1913), Covert Action (1953-1973), and Invasions (1983-present). In the first section, The Imperial Era, Kinzer includes Hawaii, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines, Nicaragua and Honduras. In the second section, Covert Action, he includes Iran, Guatemala, South Vietnam, and Chile. In the third section, Invasions, he treats Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The concluding chapter in each section (chapter four, nine, and fourteen, respectively) summarizes that particular part with the last chapter (chapter fourteen) giving overarching reasons for US involvement in other governments’ affairs.

In “The Imperial Era,” Kinzer argues that there were three general reasons why the US intervened: American prosperity, manifest destiny, and colonialism. The events that unfolded in Hawaii typify this section. In Hawaii, the first administration the US overthrew,
US businesses and the US government worked jointly to dethrone Hawaiian Queen Liliuokalani who had proposed a change to the Hawaiian constitution that allowed only Hawaiian citizens to vote. This change, if enacted, would have given the native Hawaiians more freedom. It also would have led to loss of control for US businesses – the *defacto* leadership – and their profitability, which could have led to other consequences. Eventually, Hawaii became the 50th state in the Union.

In the second part, “Covert Operations,” Kinzer notes four characteristics of American interventions. First, he notes that, with the exception of South Vietnam, there was a confluence of American corporate business interest and American legal interest. Second, he argues that United States government’s role was the primary factor in regime change. Third, he observes that the majority of the administrations the US ousted during this period were at least semi-democratic (except South Vietnam). Fourth, he notes American fear of the Soviet Union and Communism. In Chile, for example, the US government overthrew the democratically elected incoming president, Salvador Allende Gossens, and replaced him with Augusto Pinochet, a dictator who was later charged with a variety of crimes that included murder, kidnapping and torture, because the former sympathized with Fidel Castro and desired to nationalize American companies.

In the third part, “Invasions,” Kinzer gives one general reason for American interaction in other governments’ affairs – the same motive he believes underlies all American interventions – the belief that Americans have a responsibility to change governments they consider evil. For instance, in Afghanistan, the U.S. helped Osama bin Laden and the mujahidin repel the Soviet Union. Ironically, just a few years later, bin Laden masterminded the destruction of almost 3,000 people in the worst attack on American soil since the Civil War. This led the United States to intervene again in Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban and install another government.
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United States Intervention in Iranian Affairs

*Overthrow* allows Kinzer to persuade the American public to appreciate the last 100 or so years of US foreign policy for what he sees it as: a century of American intervention resulting in regime changes. It also provides the background for his publication of *All the Shah’s Men*. This book, first published in 2003 but revised in 2008, contains a new preface, “The Folly of Attacking Iran.” It is a lively account of the 1953 revolution in Iran, focused on American involvement in toppling Iran’s incipient democracy, and issuing a plea for Americans to understand why it is not a good idea to attack Iran today. Kinzer divides the text into twelve chapters, an epilogue, and two prefaces, (the original and the 2008 version).

The author details the events leading to the overthrow, all the while centering his attention on Mossadegh, who laid the groundwork for Iran’s democracy. Surrounding Mossadegh are three other central actors: Great Britain, the Iranian shahs, and the United States. In the early stages of the work, Kinzer focuses on the British. In 1901, in the D’Arcy agreement, Iran sold the rights to find oil in Abadan and the Persian Gulf area in return for £20,000, half ownership in the company, and 16 percent of the profit. When oil was found in that area seven years later, it strengthened the British hand, but turned popular opinion against the Brits because of what appeared to be the theft of their natural resources. All of this happened in the context of (1) a 1907 peace treaty the UK signed with Russia, which divided the countries’ influence over Iran. Under the treaty, Russia controlled the north and Britain retained control over the south; (2) the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, which caused Russia’s power in Iran to diminish; and (3) the 1919 Anglo-Persian agreement, which gave Britain control of Iran’s army, treasury, transportation and communications systems. Britain became the dominate power in Iran. In 1932, Iran canceled the agreement, giving two reasons: the partnership had (1) led to increased disparity between the working conditions of Iranian and British personnel, and (2) appeared to give short shrift to the Iranians economically. The cancellation led to conflict between the countries and, when in 1947 a law passed that mandated a renegotiation of the deal, relations turned from bad to worse. Inevitably, Iran severed relations with Great Britain, unknowingly thwarting a coup.
While Britain was doing its best to control Iran, as Kinzer sees it, many of Iran’s shahs were doing their best to give control away. One shah sold much of Iran’s resources to the British. Another sold the rights to find oil in Abadan and the Persian Gulf region. Still another yielded to the Anglo-Persian Agreement, which gave the Brits control of the south (but also inspired the nationalist movement). It was not until after a coup that a shah, Reza, came to power and tried to regain some of Iran’s sovereignty. He nullified the D’Arcy concession, began to gain independence from other countries (namely the UK), and was sympathetic with the Germans in World War I.

After the war, the British forced him to abdicate. His son and successor, Mohammad Reza, was not as powerful and lost much of his influence to the democracy movement in Iran. At the same time, Mossadegh was coming into his own. Conflict between these two, Kinzer argues, was a defining mark of the shah’s tenure. Mohammad Reza went along with the coup of Mossadegh in 1953, which gave him control of the country for a short while, only to lose it again to Khomeini in 1979.

Mossadegh, the central character in Kinzer’s account, was the leader of the democracy movement in Iran who eventually became prime minister. He was a passionate, driven, and politically savvy man who was known for resigning his office several times so as not to compromise on his position. As the author puts it, Mossadegh was a “visionary leader rather than a pragmatist, preferring defeat in an honorable cause to what he considered compromise” (Kinzer, 2008, p. 56). He built his political house on the foundation of two beliefs, convictions that were consistently apparent during his rule: he believed in the “rule of law” and he believed that Iranians must govern themselves.

Kinzer argues that in many ways Mossadegh was Mohammad Reza’s antagonist. Mossadegh believed Mohammad Reza sought his own welfare at the expense of the Iranian people. Mossadegh also did not like the British. Not only did he write the law mandating a renegotiation of the oil partnership between the UK and Iran in 1947, he also refused to negotiate with Britain and recommended that Parliament nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, the business in charge of oil production in Iran. When the UK tried to negotiate with him, talks failed. The British mistakenly thought that a compromise could be reached, while Mossadegh refused to make concessions and saw this as a means to Iranian independence. When the United Nations began to mediate, Mossadegh came to the US and convinced the Security Council not to pass any resolution against Iran. While in the US, the US government also tried to mediate a compromise between Britain and Mossadegh, but to no avail. This further worsened the relations between the two countries.

It was not until Iran severed relations with the UK and the US elected Dwight Eisenhower as president that the American government organized a coup to overthrow Mossadegh. He was defeated, placed under house arrest, and did not leave his compound for over a decade. It is at this point that Kinzer makes one of his most salient points: before the coup, Americans were looked upon with admiration, but after the coup they were looked upon with suspicion. Kinzer gives some interesting anecdotes of this thinking. One of the most interesting is his portrayal of the Iranian people’s admiration of Howard Baskerville, the Christian missionary from the U. S. When Baskerville died beside his Iranian friends in the Colonial Revolution in 1909, Iranians took this as evidence that the US had no ill will toward them.

On the issue of Iran, the US at first did not succumb to British demands, which led to friction between the two nations. Even under President Harry Truman, the United States did not care to intervene or overthrow the Iranian government. It was not until Eisenhower became president that American policy changed. Keeping peace with the UK was essential because of NATO, which was a strategic way to stem the threat of Communism. When Eisenhower was convinced that a change in Iran’s government would help stop this threat, he tacitly agreed. In short, the proposal called for Mohammad Reza to declare Mossadegh’s rule as prime minister illegitimate and replace him with General Fazlollah Zahedi. After one failed attempt, the plan succeeded. With this, Kinzer closes the book.
Critiquing Kinzer

Kinzer’s books are well-written. His prose is brisk and lucid. He uses narrative to good effect, finding just the perfect stories to crystallize the points he wants to make. On the whole, this is what makes his books so convincing for readers who are unfamiliar with American foreign policy in general, and its policy toward Iran in particular. But this same brisk and unencumbered style leaves the reader wanting more documentation, more global historical context, fewer generalizations, and a less jaundiced eye toward the history of American foreign policy.

In both books, documentation is wanting. There are no footnotes or endnotes. Instead, at the end of the books, there is a section that gives a page number alongside a note. There are no corresponding numbers to the notes in the body to the note section at the end of the books. Further, in both books, global historical context is wanting. The regime changes are not placed firmly within the context of world events. Little attention, for example is given to World War I and World War II and the affects that they had not only on world politics, but also on American thought. The same lack of consideration is given to Britain’s declining dynasty.

In addition, Kinzer often generalizes without documentation and asserts causal connections where he has proven only sequences. Take, for example, this sentence: “[t]he fundamental reason why countries invade other countries, or seek forcibly to depose their governments, has not changed over the course of history. It is the same reason children fight in schoolyards” (Kinzer, 2006, p. 321, Kim 2007). Or take Kinzer’s assertion that the United States sometimes overthrows regimes because of her “messianic zeal” to spread Christianity. These accounts are unsubstantiated and unwarranted. It is statements like these that lessen Kinzer’s credibility as a reliable commentator. The United States government is not seeking to “bring the gospel of Christ” to the nations by means of political and military intervention. To say this is not only inaccurate, but it is detrimental to American relations with Iran and the global community. For these reasons, and others, Kinzer’s books are a hindrance to gaining an understanding of the
motes, context, and outcomes of previous American interventions.

**Bringing Clarity to the Iran Issue:**

While Kinzer is unhelpful in these regards, his work is helpful for making at least two points: (1) under current conditions, the United States should not intervene, militarily, in Iran’s affairs, and (2) the consequences of intervention in Iran would likely be detrimental in the long run for both Iran and America. As Kinzer puts it, Newton’s Third Law of Motion is true for foreign policy just as it is for physics: for every action, there is an opposite and equal (and sometimes unplanned) reaction. When debating whether or not to intervene in another country’s affairs, the American people and her government need carefully to consider the consequences that may flow from that intervention.

Should the US intervene in the Iran situation? No. Based upon “just war” criteria, we do not see any reason, under current conditions, for military intervention (Walzer 2000). Just war theory has a long and storied heritage in the Western world, going back to writers such as Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius. Several criteria of just war theory in particular are relevant. The first is *just cause*: there must be a specific reason for going to war. In the case of Iran, we see no just cause for a military strike. What reasons might be offered? The nuclear issue? The nuclear issue does not provide just cause for military intervention. Although Iran appears to have warhead design *capabilities* as well as military uranium conversion- and enrichment-related *capabilities*, and although Iran’s president’s rhetoric toward the United States and her allies is sometimes aggressive, Iran has not attacked either the United States or any other vulnerable country (Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence 2008). As such, there is no justifiable reason for military intervention. A just war, as we see it, might be *pre-emptive* but may not be *preventive*. In a pre-emptive strike, a country may respond to an attack “once we had seen it coming but before we had felt its impact.” In a preventive strike, the aggressor “responds to a distant danger, a matter of foresight and free choice” (Walzer, 2000).
A second criterion is *last resort*: all other nonviolent options must be pursued. This implies also that during a war, all diplomatic efforts should continue in an effort to settle the grievances through negotiation rather than military conflict. A related issue here is the Iranian notion of *haq*, or equality. Hooman Majd recently emphasized the sense of rights and justice that is deeply ingrained in the Iranian psyche, and likely stems from centuries of perceived injustice at the hands of Arabs, Sunnis, and Westerners (Majd 2008). This notion of *haq* helps Westerners appreciate why obtaining nuclear power is important to the Iranian administration, if not to the Iranian people. Even as the United States retains its stance on Iran and nuclear weaponry, it must make its diplomacy an earnest and consistent interaction with *equals*.

In relation to Iran and the nuclear issue, we urge the use of an international inspection team as this seems to be a better way to deal with Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities (Bertram 2007). We believe that lessening the current sanctions, if it were to initiate real and productive discussion, must be considered. If absolutely necessary, the United States and its allies could impose additional sanctions (Jentleson 2007). But for the sake of her own integrity, and her perception around the world, the United States must put to rest talk of military strikes.

Under the two criteria mentioned—just cause and last resort—a military conflict with Iran does not meet the standards for a just war. Another criterion is one of *right intention*: In order for a just war to be waged, the intention must be to secure peace and civil order for all parties involved. This principle rules out wars of economic exploitation, or of national, religious, or ethnic cleansing. This criterion is particularly important because Kinzer’s accusation, and often the global perception of the United States is that its war against Iran would be one of economic exploitation (oil) and religious cleansing (Islam). We do not agree with this assertion. Although these accusations are bandied about regularly, it is irresponsible to say that the United States is against Islam, *per se*. Americans may be irked that Iran is an Islamic republic, and question why their president makes questionable statements about the holocaust and Israel, but they must realize that these are not reasons for war. The bottom line is that, as Kinzer pointed out,
the Iranian people ushered this system into power. While this may not be the ideal administration for Americans, it does not give them warrant to support military action against it.

Finally, the American people and her government ought also to consider carefully the consequences that may flow from an Iran intervention. This concern is reflected in the just war criteria of probability of success (ad bellum) and proportionality of projected results (ad bellum). Under these criteria, a war is not waged justly unless victory is likely and the good in achieving victory must be greater than the cost to achieve it. In light of recent events in the Middle East, including the US invasion of Iraq, it is questionable that a war with Iran would produce a clear victory or that the victory would be greater than the cost to achieve it.

A related point is that a strong Iran could very well bring a balance of power in the Middle East. As Vali Nasr and others have pointed out, the Sunni-Shia split has been historically the greatest rift in the Muslim world, though it is certainly not the only reason that Iran has played the foil to Arab moves in the Middle East (Nasser 2007). That rift has been temporarily suspended, however, as Sunnis and Shias have united against their non-Arab, non-Muslim enemies in what Bernard Lewis recently described as “the odd spectacle of Sunni and Shiite extremists occasionally cooperating in the struggle against the infidels” (Lewis 2009). In addition to the Sunni-Shia issue, Iran has other reasons to play the foil to Arab moves in the Middle East. Military intervention in Iran would remove Iran’s ability to balance power, while at the same time reinforcing the Muslim world’s suspicion of the United States’ intentions.

We grant that, at times, the United States government followed missionaries into harsh environments, but to make the epistemological jump and maintain—as Kinzer does—that the American government has a messianic zeal to spread Christianity and that this serves as a motive for American intervention is fallacious and inaccurate (Walls 1996). However, it is the perception of many around the world. The authors of this essay write as religious conservatives (evangelical Christians), and one would consider himself within the neo-conservative spectrum (Ashford), the ones Kinzer and others would likely place in the
category of “crusaders” seeking to spread Christianity through military intervention.

As evangelicals, we actually find ourselves on the dovish end of the just war spectrum. As followers of Christ, our impulse is to be at peace with all men, personally. The apostle Paul instructs us, “If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone” (Rom 12.18). Our reflex is nonviolence: “To this [suffering] you were called, because Christ suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should follow in his step....When they hurled their insults at him, he did not retaliate; when he suffered, he made no threats. Instead, he entrusted himself to him who judges justly” (1 Pet 2.21, 23). We, as well as the vast majority of evangelical Christians, would never support military action for the sake of spreading Christianity. The gospel of Christ is not advanced by means of the sword.

However, it is also true that the Christian Scriptures teach that the state may legitimately employ force in order to protect her citizens and keep public order. Indeed, the state is given these responsibilities by God himself and the Christian, therefore, is called upon to support the government in its legitimate role. It is incumbent upon Christians, therefore, to urge their leaders in Congress and their President to shape foreign policy in a manner that reflects the peaceful and non-violent dispositions described in Scripture. Military invention must have just cause and it must necessarily be a last resort.

**Conclusion**

As we write this article, President Obama has spoken to the Iranian administration by video on March 20, 2009: “We have serious differences that have grown over time,” Obama said. “My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community.” President Ahmadinejad responded, through media adviser Ali Akbar Javanfekr, that the United States lift sanctions and admit to past mistakes, such as their support for Saddam Hussein in Iraq’s 1980-88 war with Iran (Chipman and Nasseri 2009). The response
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It is important to understand the context of the United States' stance on Iran. The decision to attack Iran is a complex issue, and it is important to consider all the factors involved. The United States has been engaged in a sanctions campaign against Iran, which has been ongoing for several years. The sanctions have been implemented in response to Iran's nuclear program, which is seen by many as a threat to world security.

Despite the sanctions, Iran has continued to develop its nuclear program. The United States has been in negotiations with Iran, and there has been some progress in the past. However, the negotiations have been complicated by the United States' stance on Iran. The United States has been pushing for stronger sanctions, while Iran has been pushing for an end to the sanctions.

The United States has been accused of not adhering to its promises of change. This has led to a lack of trust between the United States and Iran. The United States has also been accused of not being transparent in its dealings with Iran. This has led to a lack of confidence in the negotiations.

We are hopeful for improved relations between the United States and Iran. While we cannot affirm Kinzer's jaundiced view of the history of American intervention, we agree with his bottom line: the United States should not intervene militarily in Iran. Such intervention would be unjust and likely would have deleterious consequences not only for both states, but also for the global community.

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